In developing secure applications and systems, the designers often must incorpomte secure user identifi cation in the design specification. In this paper, we study secure off-line authenticated user identification schemes based on a biometric system that can measure a user's biometric accumtely (up to some Hamming distance). The schemes presented here enhance iden tification and authorization in secure applications by binding a biometric template with authorization infor mation on a token such as a magnetic strip. Also de veloped here are schemes specificaUy designed to min imize the compromise of a user's private biometrics data, encapsulated in the authorization information, without requiring secure hardware tokens.
Introduction
Secure digital identification schemes are becoming increasingly important, as more security applications require identification based on physical characteristics rather than solely on a user's knowledge of a secret cryptographic key or password. The increased interest in such applications, ranging from door access to elec tronic commerce applications, has led to an increased interest in methods for secure and accurate identifica tion [8, 5, 18, 17] of individuals as well as machines and objects. In this paper we are interested in sys tems of identification that use measurable biological features, biometrics, which can be readily measured at the point of application. It is desirable that such measurements be non-invasive and simple to perform.
One biometric that has been suggested is the iris scan [3, 12, 6, 21] .
On-line applications secured through the use of bio metric authentication typically are based on a push or pull model. In both models, the first step is a user initialization, which occurs when the user's biomet ric template is registered with the on-line server. Af ter initialization, when a user wants access that re quires biometric identification, a biometric authoriza tion process is performed. At this time the user's bio metric is read by a reader. In the push model, the reader transmits (preferably via a private channel) the reading to the on-line server; the on-line server then verifies the validity of the reading based on the user's template in the server's directory; and finally the server sends an authenticated acceptance or rejec tion message back to the reader. In the pull model, the reader requests the template from the server, and the reader performs the verification steps after receiving the template over an authenticated and, preferably, private channel from the server. In both cases, an authenticated channel is necessary for some commu nications between the on-line database and the reader. The authentication can also provide for a binding of a user's biometric with some form of authorization, as established by trust relationships between the reader and the on-line database.
Here we are interested in developing biometric based identification systems which do not require the � corporation of an on-line database for the security mfrastructure. Such databases are not always practi cal in mobile environments, such as military applica tions, and are often cost prohibitive since they require expensive wiring for connectivity or costly wireless de vices. In order to remove the connectivity require ments, an off-line biometric system is achieved by in corporating a biometric template on a storage device / token (e.g., magnetic strip or smartcard) which pro vides for a reliable storage medium; however, there are no security requirements required of the token. We, therefore, will work in the pull model with the storage device containing sufficient information to validate the authenticity of the user's acquired biometric template to the biometric generated during user initialization. To provide for the user biometric/user authorization binding, a trusted authorization officer who authenti cates (signs) the user's biometric template is incorpo rated into our infrastructure.
A biometric identification system which provides the user's biomeric template in the clear may not be acceptable to a user, because a user's biometric tem plate could be used for unacceptable purposes if the template is obtained by an unauthorized individual. Biometric templates can provides information which a user may not want provided readily. For instance, a finger print reading can be used for law enforcement purposes and an eye scan (retinal or iris) may be able to detect medical conditions. We study the feasibility of protecting a user's bio metric on an insecure device. Such protection may be beneficial if the storage device holding the biomet ric template is lost or stolen. This added protection may provide for stronger user acceptance, since the user's template is not sent in the clear. In our study we propose a classification of secure off-line biometric systems according to who, if anyone, in the system has a private decryption key (When templates are en crypted).
An important model to consider is the case where neither the user nor the reader maintains private de cryption keys, because it is a scalable solution when the user must have authorization amongst multiple readers and when password protection is inappropri ate. Providing for authorization bound to a biomet ric template appears to be inherently difficult in this model, because the user's biometric template cannot exist in the clear on the storage device. To achieve our result we had to ov ercome several hurdles. The first is to deal with errors which oc cur during the reading of biometrics. Variances from multiple readings of the same user often occur due to problems such a scratch on a finger, disease affecting blood vessels in the retina, variations in light caus ing changes in the pupil size during iris reading, and different positioning of the object being scanned (fin ger, head, etc.). In an off-line system if there are any discrepancies between the original template and later readings, the biometric template cannot be verified against the authentication officer's authentication in formation.
Another hurdle that had to be overcome is that cryptographic authentication mechanisms (e.g., a dig ital signature) that the trusted authorization officer invokes to bind authorization with a user's template do not necessarily hide all the information of the in put (i.e., provide confidentiality of the message that is signed), thereby potentially leaking information about the user's biometrics. Let us give an exam ple of a signature scheme S I G which leaks the ac quired message completely. Let sig(m) be the sig nature of a message m; observe as a simple exam ple that one can generate a new secure (unforgeable) signature function SIG(m) = (m, sig(m)), (e.g. mes sage/signature pair (m', (m, sig(m» is valid if m' = m and Verify(m',sig(m» = TRUE). Hence, signature functions do not necessarily protect against informa tion leakage of the input. A solution to this problem is simple, of course, if the trusted authorization officer and reader share a private key.
It should be noted that our system is also applicable to on-line systems where information is stored in an on-line database instead of on storage cards. By us-149 ing our system in an on-line environment, one is able to reduce the security requirements imposed on the database. For example, our techniques prevent the database manager from reading biometric templates directly from the database or archives.
We also note that designers of secure systems are often hampered by the lack of mechanisms to satisfy the various requirements of a secure key management infrastructure. This infrastructure may have to deal with generation of both public and private keys, au thenticated dissemination of keys, and the storage of keys, as weB as other concerns such as maintaining privacy of users and trusted circulation of user autho rizations. The security of this infrastructure is often hindered by insufficient mechanisms to secure private keys for users. We noticed that when one assumes that a user's biometric information has sufficient un certainty, our technique also allows for the biometric template to be used as a private key. Since there may not be sufficient entropy (i.e., uncertainty) in a user's biometric, our system allows us to augment password encryption with the entropy provided in a biometric.
Our solutions are based on cryptography. We do not assume unproven, and usually expensive, physi cal protection mechanisms such as optical computers (see [20] ).
The result we present here has many features:
• We present off-line identification systems based on any biometric technology that can be mea sured ac�curately (up to some Hamming distance).
• Enhancements also allow for incorporation of au thorization information from a trusted authoriza tion oHicer. In essence our system binds the user identity not only for simple access but for autho ri'lation.
• W' e clas sify off-line biometric systems according to which entity (e.g., reader, user, authorization offi cer)., if any, must maintain a long term private decryption key for the purpose of hiding a user's biometric from compromise.
• Based on our classification of off-line biometrics, we discuss the feasibility of designing a system in which information stored in the the storage device does not compromise the biometric information of the individual involved when a card is lost or stolen.
• The techniques pres ented provide for on-line iden tification systems iln which the privacy of a bio metric template is protected on the database.
• We propose an infrastructure and mechanisms which allow biometrics to enable cryptographic applications when there is sufficient entropy in a user's biometric.
• In presenting our results, we shall relate them to the iris technology [3, 12, 6, 21] . 
Model
We shall propose several models in which off-line biometrics can be incorporated into a security infras tructure. In order to motivate the design of our off-line system, we first analyze in Section 2.1 how an on-line system would work and the requirements which may be desired for such a system. We then investigate in Section 2.2 the off-line model for access control, au thorization and private key storage.
In our models below we use an authorization offi cer entity in the architecture. The authorization of ficer's role is to certify (e.g., authenticate or sign) a binding between a user's biometric template and some other attributes of the user. The authorization officer is thereby the trusted third party attesting to autho rization as well as to other user attributes. The au thorization officer plays a role that is similar to the Certification Authority (CA) in a public key hierar chy (see [22] ), except that the authorization officer binds biometrics to user attributes, while a CA binds a public key to user attributes.
In considering biometrics, we note that we need to make the following assumption:
We assume that a biometric is not reproduceable. Hence it is unique to an individual, but even more importantly, one should not be able to artificially generate a "device" with suf ficient characteristics to pass a biometric verification of a user.
This assumption must be achieved in any high con sequence application protected by a biometric system, in order to provide secure and unique identification. Otherwise, an adversary with sufficient probability will be able to impersonate a user by reproducing the authorized user's biometric. To provide for such pro tection, properties such as pupillary unrest of an iris and blood flow and heat from a finger scan have been 150 used to support this assumption in some biometric sys tems. Throughout this paper we assume the biometric system we incorporate into our designs provides suffi cient protection to provide the reproduction assump tion.
On-line Model
Our architecture for an off-line system is motivated by the on-line system. We first briefly review the model for an on-line system.
The primary application of biometrics today in volves the use of an on-line server. During system setup biometric readers are connected to a trusted on line server through secure links which are either cryp tographically secured channels or in which physical se curity is established. If cryptographic security is used, then a secure key distribution is required.
User initialization is performed by the user having his/her biometric template registered with the on-line server. Later, when a user wants access which requires the user to pass through a biometric identification, a biometric authorization process is performed. The user first has his/her biometric read by a reader; the reader transmits the reading to the on-line server; the on-line server then verifies the validity of the read ing based on the user's template in the server's di rectory; and finally the server sends an authenticated acceptance or rejection message back to the reader. This is the push model for an off-line system. In the pull model, the reader requests the template from the server, and the reader perform the verification steps, after receiving the template over an authenti cated and, preferably, private channel from the server.
Our off-line model below is inspired by the pull model. It simulates the on-line transmission of a user's template to the reader with storage device containing a user's biometric (or similar information) for verifi cation authenticated by an authorization officer's sig nature. In the off-line system, the biometric authorization process cannot have a direct (on-line) information re trieval mechanism. This requirement means that the push model cannot be used, because it requires a com munication from the reader to the on-line database and back. The pull model, however, can be simulated by incorporating a storage token which replicates the information sent by the on-line reader. We should note, however, that as with any off-line identification system, immediate revocation of user privileges is not possible. This limitation must be taken into consider ation by the system designer during the development of the security architecture.
We now discuss the workflow in the off-line model.
Initialization process:
The user initialization process for the off-line model is represented in Figure 1 . The secure authoriza tion officer takes as input an initial biometric reading, called the user biometric template, the authorization information defining the set of privileges granted the user by the authorization officer, and other user at tributes. As output a storage device such as a mag netic strip card is encoded with information which es tablishes a binding between a user's biometrics (and, possibly, other user attributes) and the user's autho rization granted by the authorization officer. Application process:
During a secure application, as depicted in Figure 2 , a reader takes as input the user's storage device (to ken) and reads the user's biometric. Given this infor mation, which may also include other user attributes not represented in this figure, the user's authorization attributes can be obtained and linked to the autho rization officer. This information may now be securely transmitted to the secure application. Note that the primary difference between an off-line and on-line sys tem is that the storage device can be replaced by an authenticated transmission link to the authorization officer (or its database) in the on-line system.
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Certain principles are incorporated in our model: 1. There must be a binding between a user's biomet ric and a trusted authorization officer. Hence, we require a storage device (e.g., magnetic strip or smartcard) to store the binding information. 2. There is a need for a scalable solution when pri V'dCy of a user's biometric must be protected in ca.se a storage device is lost or stolen. The pri mary scalability issues are who must store private keys and how much storage must be provided on the cards.
Principle 2 suggests an interesting feasibility ques tion. Is it ]possible to provide a scalable solution and protect a user's biometric, and if so, what requirement must be im posed on the security architecture? To an swer the question, we now classify the off-line security architectures by who, if anyone, must hold a private key.
Private key in reader: If a reader has a private key to decrypt biometric information encrypted by the authorization officer, then there will be no leakage of biometric information when a card is lost or stolen. However, such a system is not scal able if the memory device has low storage capa bility and the application's architecture requires multiple readers (each with its own private key), because a separate encryption of the biometric template is required for each reader. This tech nique however, can be effective if there are few readers in the architecture. In Figure 3 we show the information that must be stored on a storage device when multiple readers are used.
To be effective, this approach requires that the readers provide some form of protection for the reader'8 private key (e.g., FIPS PUB 140-1 stan dards [9] ), because if the private key is stolen from the device, the adversary is able to read the bio metric from any user's storage device.
Password-protection: Password protection can hide information stored on a card if the password has sufficient entropy. This approach is a scalable solution (e.g., using password encryption [16) to encrypt the biometric template with a USer mem orized password), if revealing a password to a reader is considered safe and the readers have a User password input mechanism. Generally, pass word protection is considered insufficient, since it usually has low entropy and is therefore easily USer authentication when feasible [10) .
No keys or passwords: Potentially, this is the most scalable approach with minimal system compo nent requirements for an off-line system. Such systems, as will be shown, are possible when the entropy in a biometric is large enough.
NOTE: It should be noted that the off-line systems we shall discuss are also applicable to on-line systems where information is stored in an on-line database in stead of on storage cards. By using our system in an on-line environment, one is able to reduce the security requirements imposed on the database, where privacy restrictions on the information exit.
Background
We briefly present some background from Coding Theory and Cryptography that we will need in later sections.
Cryptography
In order to provide maximum protection of user bio metric information, key material and other sensitive information on storage devices, we utilize mechanisms which prevent the storage device from leaking infor mation (without the user's biometric) to an adversary of a specified strength. In order to do so we will Use the tools which we informally discuss below.
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A Random Oracle is a publicly known function R with the property that when provided a value x the oracle produces a random number R(x), that is totally independent of x (see, e.g., [ 
1]).
A Partial Information Hiding Function (i.e.
an oracle hashing function) [4] can be described in formally as a hashing algorithm H(x) = c and a ver ification function Vex, c) =} {True, F alse} with the following properties: 1) infeasible to find a collision, i.e. Vex, c) and V(y, c) cannot both be true if x ¥ y 2) information hiding, for a polynomial time adver sary having c = H(x), gives no further information on x beyond the ability to exhaustively search for x.
The final tool that we need is Universal One Way Hash Function families [14] . A Universal One Way Hash Function family is a family of hash functions Fk(x) = c that utilizes a key k to select a member of the family. In addition a polynomial bounded ad versary cannot choose an x, then upon learning k, find a collision, i.e. a pair x and y, x ¥ y such that Fk(X} = Fk(Y}'
Coding Theory
Our interest in error correction codes stems from the fact that the biometrics acquired are not mea sured perfectly. Each measurement results in a vector that is at some Hamming distance (discussed below) from other measurements. Empirical work in measur ing some biometrics, such as the iris, has shown that the expected hamming distance between any two bio metric measurements is about 10 percent. These er rors in the measured vectors appear to be independent. Hence error correction is critical to the computation of a biometric in this scheme.
We are interested in two types of error correction: Error correction at the point of acquiring the biometric, and error correction during the verification phase. Empirical measurements show that the errors in a bio metric are independent, with a crossover probability of .016 [6J. This observation suggests that if several measurements of a biometric are subjected to major ity decoding (discussed below) at the time of template creation, then that template can then be considered the "canonical" biometric template. Once this canon ical biometric is obtained, error correction check digits are computed for this biometric, which will be used as will be shown below.
When a user presents for verification, the same pro cedure is used to arrive at a biometric that is then used in the rest of the process to verify identity. In this phase, error correction is used to remove residual errors, using the check digits computed above. This process will correct the measured biometric into the canonical biometric if the number of errors are within the tolerance.
Hamming Distance: For simplification, we shall restrict our discussion of error correcting codes to bi nary codes [2, 13, 15] . The (binary) Hamming weight of a codeword c, denoted by Hw(c), is the number of one bits in the codeword. That is, for an n bit string 
Bounded Distance Decoding
To allow for error correction of a biometric, we encode a K bit biometric into an N bit code vector, with N -K redundant (or check) digits. The description of an (N, K, D) error correcting code with rate KIN> !, (using bounded distance de coding of up to D 2 1 errors), is provided to the autho rization officer and biometric readers. To ensure that an impostor is not accepted, it is important to set the error correction capability of the error correcting code to a level that prevents an impostor's biometric from being "corrected" into a valid biometric (i.e., that no more than the allowed number of errors will be cor rected).
Identification Scheme Assuming Public Biometrics
We now discuss an off-line identification protocol in which we assume that there is no requirement to hide one's biometric. Based on the reproduction as sumption, the protocol below only protects against an adversary trying to prove that its potentially falsified biometric is the same as one signed by the authoriza tion officer. Hence, we assume that the biometric can be read with sufficient accuracy in the amount of time available for the scan (possible with majority decod ing, as discussed in Section 3.2) such that an (N, K, D) algebraic code will suffice to remove the remaining er rors from the biometric2.
The protocol below provides a framework for the rest of our discussion:
System Setup: The authorization officer generates its public and private keys and disseminates its public key to the biometric readers. The system also sets up an algebraic (N, K, D) code.
User Initialization: To register, M biometric tem plates of length K are independently generated for the user. These M vectors are put through a majority decoder to obtain the user's K bit template f. Given the K information bits f, an N bit codeword Tile is con structed, where C are the check bits in the (N, K, D) code defined in system setup. The following four items go on the card:
1. Name of the individual, NAME 2. Other public attributes ATTR, such as the issu ing center and a user's access control list 3. Check digits C 4. Sig(NAME, ATTR, T), where Sig(x) denotes the authorization officer's signature of x.
Biometric Authorization Process (verification)
When a user presents a card, M biometric tem plate8 are independently generated for the user.
2RecalJ that the code is set up osuch that it can remove enough errors to allow the system to recognize the legitimate user of the card but not someone else, i.e. bounded distance decoding.
These M vectors are put through majority decod ing and bounded distance decoding using the check digits e to obtain the user's K bit current read ing T'. Then Sig (N AME, ATTR, T) is verified with the authorization officer's public key and message NAME, ATTR, T'. Successful signature verification implies successful user identification. 5 Identification Schemes with Private
Templates
We now discuss several off-line identification pro tocols. We remind the reader that in the model dis cussed in Section 2.2, the user obtains a storage device containing information on the user's template and a secure authenticated binding with an authorization of ficer. The two trivial cases are when there exists a pri vate key in the reader and when password protection is used (See Section 2.1).
For the rest of this section we make the following additional assumption: Assumption 2 Privacy: It is assumed that a digi tal representation of the biometric cannot be produced with sufficient accuracy to pass a biometric authoriza tion process (with respect to a user's template only and not to other biological tests such as pupilary unrest) without the cooperation of the subject involved. Hence, we assume that the biometric being measured can only come from an individual submitting to the measure ment.
We therefore now assume that there is a strong phys ical binding of a biometric to an individual, and that the biometric template cannot be "taken" (copied, stored, etc.) readily. Observe that information held by only one person and not obtainable by others is a property of a private key. This assumption inspired us to investigate how biometrics can enable crypto graphic mechanisms.
One may argue that this assumption 2 is not ac ceptable, especially against a strong adversary. But in practice, much as passwords protect computer sys tems, this assumption can be beneficial for systems whose adversaries do not have such strengths. More over, if one does not accept this assumption, then one should also not believe that biometric information should be kept confidential, since it is readily available anyway.
Private Biometric
We now discuss an off-line biometric system which provides for privacy of a user's biometric, assuming the privacy assumption holds and sufficient entropy in biometric template5.
System Setup: The authorization officer generates its public and private keys and disseminates its pub lic key to the biometric readers. The system also sets up an algebraic (N, K, D) code. We remind the reader that we use bounded distance decoding (See Section 3.2.1).
User Initialization: To register, M biometric tem plates of length K are independently generated for the 154 legitimate user. These M vectors are put through a majority decoder to obtain the user's K bit template T. Given the K information digits T, an N digit code word E = Tile is constructed, where e are the check digits, in the (N, K, D) code defined in system setup. A storage device is constructed with the following in formation:
1. Name of the individual, NAME 2. Other public attributes ATTR, such as the issu ing center and a user's access control list.
3.
The check digits e, of the biometric 4. Sig(Hash(NAME, ATTR, Tile)) where Sig(x) de notes the authorization officer's signature of x, and Hash(·) is a partial information hiding hash function [4] (e.g., Sig(Hash(·)) is a content-hiding signature) or a random oracle (See [1] ).
Biometric authorization process {verification}:
\\-' hen a user presents a card, M biometric tem plates are independently generated for the user. These M vectors are put through majority decoding to obtain the user's K bit template T'. Er ror correction is performed on codeword E' = T'lle to obtain the corrected biometric Ti l . The signa ture Sig(Hash(NAME, ATTR, Tillie)) is then veri fied. Successful signature verification implies the user passed the identification step.
We next prove the correctness and security of the protocols above.
Theorem 1 The biometric identification system above correctly accepts a valid subject whose T' has less than � errors.
Proof.
Let T' be a scanned biometric, us ing majority decoding of M readings. Applying the (N, K, D) algebraic decoding to E' = T'lle we ob tain the corrected biometric Til. If Ef has less than � errors, then E' is correctly decoded, resulting in a corrected biometric Til that matches the original bio metric T. The signature is then verified using the public key of the authorization officer. Proof.
(Sketch) This proof reduces to two cases. First, if the information on the memory device was at some time signed by the authorization officer (whether on this card or another one), then being accepted im plies that either:
• Displaying a biometric which is close enough (within bound defined for the biometric) to the one that was signed by the authorization officer invalidates the reproduction assumption.
• The signature scheme accepts two different mes sages, implying the signature scheme is forgeable.
The other case is that the information on the mem ory card was not at some time signed by the authorizar tion officer, but this case also reduces to the signature scheme being forgeable.
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We now argue the privacy of our system. First, the hash is necessary when one does not know if the signature system leaks information about its input. Therefore, in order not to have an information hiding requirement of the signature function, we incorporate a random oracle or a partial information hiding hash function.
We cannot make the standard cryptographic reduc tion proof showing a polynomial time adversary is un able to attack the system. A reduction proof could be achieved if we assume that one can develop a biomet ric system in which the entropy in templates grows as the security parameter of the system grows. (That is, the reader can make finer and finer readings with the growth of a security parameter.) Without such an assumption, there is a "constant" size of uncertainty (remember we do not assume the reader has a private key or other private information) on the storage device representing the biometric information. As the secu rity parameter grows, the adversary is able to eventu ally try all possibilities and check for correctness using the authorization officer's authentication information.
We can argue that since the hash function is a ran dom oracle or partial information hiding hash func tion, the signature leaks no information. The check bits leak, as a conservative estimate, N -K bits of information, which is small. As will be shown for iris scans (See Section 6), the entropy of the biometric template is around 173 bits. By applying majority decoding in the biometric reading process, one can use an algebraic code with N = 2074 and K = 2048, leaving 147 bits of entropy.
Biometrics as an Enabler
If the biometric has sufficient entropy, than the bio metric itself can be used as a key. In fact, the tem plate becomes a key for encrypting other private keys and private information. Thus, biometrics can be an enabler of cryptographic functions, if there exists suf ficient entropy in the biometrics.
We are able to enable cryptographic applications through biometrics, since biometrics can hide private information such as keys. It may be worthwhile to encrypt other valuable information, such as crypto graphic keys (Keys), private attributes (Private) in cluding private access control lists, and other biomet ric information (Bio) including physical descriptions (e.g., Brown hair, Hazel eyes, 5' 11", 200 lbs.).
There, of course, is concern that a biometric is a lifetime key that cannot be revoked easily. Therefore, we suggest augumenting pass words, PINs, etc., with biometric entropy, in ess ence taking mUltiple sources with weak entropy to produce a key with a larger en tropy. We included a PIN in this protocol to allow the user to add entropy into the final key. This addition 155 is especially important when one does not believe in the privacy assumption.
Let UOWHF denote a universal one way hash function!14) and KA be a key for application A known by the reader and the authorization officer for appli cation A. Instead of a signature as in item 4 in the protocol from Section 5.1, the following encryption is encoded for each application A (where KA is applica tion A's private key and PINA is the user's PIN for application A). New itc;:m 4. enCA = ENCUOW HFKA (PINA,T) ( K eys, PrivateBio, Sig(msg)) where Sig(msg) = Sig(NAME, ATTR, Keys, PrivateBio, Hash(TIIC)).
Correctness of the above is trivial to prove. Infor mally we can prove security in a manner similar to that use d in the last section. Moreover, privacy of the private attributes is due to the large entropy of either PINA and/or T and the security of the encryption scheme. The UOWHF maximizes the amount of en tropy obtained from combining the PIN and template as a key.
Incorporating Multiple Biometrics When faced with adversaries with sufficient motivation and re sources, Assumption 2 and even Assumption 1 may be called into question on a given biometric. To ad dress such situations one can extend the previous work to provide support for two or more biometrics.
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Iris Sean Biometric As discussed above, our scheme depends on the ex istence of biometric systems that reduce a stable char acteristic of individuals to a binary encoding with high entropy and significant Hamming distance between in dividuals. One such system that has received exten sive study is iris scans 13, 12, 6, 7, 21] .
The human iris is the colorful doughnut-shaped or gan surrounding the pupil, as distinguished from the retina which is the hemispherical organ behind the cornea, lens, iris and pupil. The iris has highly de tailed texture and is unique for each individual, differ ing between identical twins and between left and right eyes of the same individual. It has been determined that the iris: imparts the same singularity to individu als as does the fingerprint [6) .
A biometric system developed by IriScan Inc. per forms the following functions to acquire an iris scan. When a user presents himself/herself, the system per forms image analysis to determine if an iris is visible, the degree of occlusion of the iris by the eyelid, and the degree of spectral reflection; it also assesses the quality of the focus and locates the iris. The system adjusts for pupillary constriction, overall image size, head tilt and cydovergence of the eye.
The system then proceeds to compute the encoding (scan) for the iris.
Remarks on Scan Sizes and Iris Scan Time
In [6, 21] it has been found that reliable iris scans can be computed from an individual in about 100 mil liseconds. The scans that are computed are 256-byte vectors. These vectors have an error rate of 10 percent; that is, for a given user, repeated sampling results in biometric vectors that have a Hamming distance of 10 percent on the average. Thus one can say a vector has an "error" of about 10%. In the discussion above, we considered multiple scans and majority decoding to reduce the "errors" in the scan. If the time needed for multiple scans is prohibitive for an application, then one can reduce the need for costly error correction by reducing the size of the scanned vector. The 256-byte vectors have a high degree of redundancy. It has been determined empirically that H(IRSSCANS) � 173 bits. This entropy guarantees that iris scans have a probability of duplicates of about 1 in 1052. Given that the entropy is large, it is possible to reduce the size of the scanned vector T without reducing the se lectivity of the scans among the world population.
Consider the final scanned vector T. We then com pute a reduced vector T' as follows:
1. Apply a permutation to the vector T 2. Let T' = least L bits of T Reducing the size of the scanned vector has the advantage of reducing the cost and time of the identi fication systems. If the time to perform a scan (about 100 milliseconds) is not an undue burden for the ap plication, then multiple scans of the iris result in the following error rates, using majority decoding.
No. of scans 1 3 11 21 Per bit prob. of error 0.1 0.028 0.000306 0.0000 01 35
